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DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF 
PERMISSIBLE STATE AND 
LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
PROGRAMS 
JANICE R. FRANKE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1989 case of Richmond v. Croson,l the United States 
Supreme Court issued a decision2 which has had a tremendous 
impact on subsequent judicial evaluations of other public sector 
affirmative action efforts, and hence also on the adoption and 
structuring of state and local affirmative action programs.3 One 
significant factor about the Croson decision was that it was the 
first time a majority of the Court set strict scrutiny as the stan-
dard of review for assessing the constitutionality of state and lo-
cal race-based affirmative action endeavors.4 Despite this agree-
ment as to the proper standard of review, however, there was no 
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Ohio State University. B.A. 1977 Smith Col-
lege; J.D. 1983 Ohio State University School of Law. 
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson declared invalid a Richmond, Virginia ordinance set-
ting aside 30 percent of the value of public construction contracts for minority owned or 
controlled business enterprises. 
2. There were six separate opinions (including two dissenting opinions) filed in the 
case. Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion, parts of which were joined by other 
concurring Justices. A majority of six Justices determined that the Richmond set-aside 
was unconstitutional. For a more thorough discussion of the case and the various opin-
ions, see J. R. Franke, Richmond v. Croson: The Setting Aside of Set-Asides? 34 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 603 (1990). 
3. The remainder of this article reviews the impact of Croson on subsequent judicial 
evaluations of other public sector affirmative action programs. Regarding the impact of 
Croson on states or municipalities trying to justify adoption of such programs, see Doro-
thy J. Gaiter, Racial Reviews, Court Ruling Makes Discrimination Studies A Hot New 
Industry, WALL ST. J., August 13, 1993, at AI; Barbara Carmen, Report: Minority Con-
tractors Wronged, City Shows Injustice to Gain Court OK of Corrective Action, COLUM-
BUS DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 1992, at C1. 
4. Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive 
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731 (1989). 
387 
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majority agreement as to what exactly is necessary for an affirm-
ative action program to pass muster under the strict scrutiny 
standard. II This uncertainty has produced various apparently in-
consistent outcomes in subsequent constitutional challenges of 
different types of state and local affirmative action programs. 
A. A SUMMARY REVIEW OF RICHMOND V. CROSON 
At issue in the Croson case was a Richmond, Virginia ordi-
nance requiring nonminority prime contractors to subcontract at 
least thirty percent of the value of their contracts to minority 
owned or controlled enterprises (MBEs).6 The ordinance closely 
mimicked a set-aside program included by Congress in the Pub-
lic Works Employment Act of 1977,7 which earlier had been up-
held as a valid affirmative action effort.s The Richmond ordi-
nance in Croson defined minority group members as Black, 
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens. It 
imposed no additional requirement that a business have local 
ties to be preferred under the ordinance.9 The ordinance allowed 
for a waiver of the set-aside requirement if a prime contractor 
could show that reasonable efforts failed to locate a qualified 
and willing MBE.lO The plan included a sunset provision causing 
it to expire five years after its adoption. ll The Richmond City 
Council adopted the plan after a public hearing in which testi-
mony was presented which indicated that there was widespread 
racial discrimination within the construction industry generally 
and that less than one percent of the city's construction con-
tracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the past five 
years.12 The plan was challenged by a nonminority contractor 
5. [d. at 1732; see also Franke, supra note 2. 
6. For a fuller description of the underlying facts and the history of the Croson case, 
see Franke, supra note 2. 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6734 (1982). 
8. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This act required grantees of fed-
eral assistance to expend a minimum of ten percent of each grant on minority business 
enterprises. 
9. Croson, 488 U.S. at 478. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 479-80. Testimony offered by representatives of local contractors' associa-
tions indicated that they knew of no discrimination experienced or practiced by their 
members. However, there was almost no minority membership in those associations. [d. 
at 480. 
2
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who was denied a waiver of the set-aside requirement. IS 
The lower courts initially upheld the set-aside plan.14 The 
Fourth Circuit evaluated the plan under the guidance of the Su-
preme Court's review of Congress' set-aside program in Fullilove 
v. Klutznick,III and found the plan valid since the plan was 
adopted by a body competent to do so, the Council had ade-
quate justification for concluding that remedial action was nec-
essary, and the plan was reasonably tailored to eliminate the ef-
fects of past discrimination. IS The Supreme Court vacated that 
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its 
intervening decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion. I7 On remand, the Fourth Circuit read Wygant as requiring 
a state or local public entity's affirmative action efforts to be 
based on a showing of past discrimination by the acting entity 
and the means adopted to be narrowly tailored to remedy the 
remaining effects of that discrimination, and concluded that the 
Richmond plan failed to meet either requirement. IS 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's judg-
ment. I9 Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion, parts of 
which gained majority support. Four Justices agreed that Con-
gress' remedial affirmative action powers are broader and thus 
subject to less stringent judicial review than similar measures 
13. [d. at 483. 
14. See Croson, 779 F.2d 181, 184, 188, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1985). 
15. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Fourth Circuit actually borrowed the inter-
pretation of the various opinions in Fullilove from the Eleventh Circuit decision in 
South Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 
Fla., 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984). The constitutional 
requirements identified for race conscious remedial action were that the action was un-
dertaken by a properly authorized body, that the race conscious action was based on an 
adequate determination that such remedy was necessary to counteract the lingering ef-
fects of past discrimination, and that the mechanism was precisely fitted to that purpose. 
448 U.S. at 467, 478, 489, 520-21; see Franke, supra note 2, at 606 n.23, 26-28. 
16. Croson, 779 F.2d at 188, 190-91. 
17. 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). Wygant involved a 
contract provision between a school board and the teachers' union permitting the lay-off 
of more senior non minority teachers in order to preserve minority teachers' representa-
tion in the workforce. A plurality of the Court asserted that public entities undertaking 
affirmative action steps must have a firm factual basis for believing that the remedial 
action is necessary, and a majority of the Court found that the provision at issue unduly 
burdened the rights of nonminority teachers. [d. at 274-78, 283-84, 292, 294-95. 
18. Croson, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357-62 (4th Cir. 1987). 
19. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989). For a fuller description of the 
various Justice's opinions, see Franke, supra note 2, at 607-16. 
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undertaken by state or local legislative bodies.20 Five Justices 
agreed that even remedial race-based classifications employed by 
state or local governments are subject to strict scrutiny review.21 
However, when attempting to articulate what evidence is neces-
sary to justify the use of affirmative action and the degree of 
freedom to be allowed the acting entity in implementing a pro-
gram, no majority could agree on a set rule, and no opinion 
stated a generally applicable formula. For example, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
White and Kennedy stated that a significant statistical disparity 
between available qualified minorities and the rate at which mi-
norities participate in the relevant activity could give rise to an 
inference of discriminatory exclusion, which in extreme cases 
could justify a narrowly tailored affirmative action program.22 
These Justices also would allow affirmative relief based on a pat-
tern of individual discriminatory acts, "if supported by appro-
priate statistical proof."23 The proffered measure of the suffi-
ciency of the evidentiary base for an affirmative action program 
20. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91, 521. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice White, distinguished between Congress' remedial powers and state/ 
local remedial powers based upon Congress' broad powers to legislate for the national 
welfare and to regulate commerce, and upon the Fourteenth Amendment's positive grant 
of enforcement authority to Congress, as contrasted with its placement of limits on state 
and local authority to take race-based action. Justice Scalia believes that Congress' re-
medial powers are fundamentally different than those of state and local governments -
he believes that state and local governments may only use race-based action to undo a 
discriminatory system endemic to the government's operation. See also Franke, supra 
note 2 at 608, 613. The Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
Most lower federal courts have applied that distinction in subsequent reviews of 
state and local affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 
942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (affording more leeway to Congress' determination that re-
medial affirmative action was necessary, applied where state adopted federal set-aside 
without independent findings of local effects of discrimination under Fullilove standard); 
Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2261 (1991). To the extent that the state was acting as an agent of the federal gov-
ernment in granting preferential treatment to MBEs, under Fullilove, specific local find-
ings of discrimination are not necessary to sustain the state's adherence to the federal 
program, though state application of the preference to non-federally funded projects 
needed independent justification under Croson. 
21. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 520. Justice Scalia would not permit state and local 
governments to engage in race-based affirmative action except where necessary to dis-
mantle a discriminatory system operated by the government entity. [d. at 521. 
22. [d. at 509. The failure of the statistical evidence in the case of the Richmond 
ordinance lay in the fact the there was no appropriate comparison to the number of 
qualified MBEs available for local contracting work. [d. at 510. 
23. [d. at 509. 
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is that the evidence is sufficient to define the scope of the injury 
and the extent of the remedy needed.24 At one extreme, Justice 
Scalia would not permit state and local race-based remedial pro-
grams except where race-based classifications are necessary to 
undo a discriminatory system maintained by the acting entity.211 
On the other hand, Justice Stevens would not necessarily require 
any evidence of past discrimination to justify affirmative action, 
because he views the goal of promoting diversity alone as valid 
in some circumstances.26 
In the case of the Richmond ordinance, conclusory state-
ments about the existence of discrimination in the construction 
industry generally and the statistical disparity between the 
number of contracts awarded to MBEs and the proportionate 
representation of minorities in the general population were 
deemed inadequate to establish the existence of discrimination 
in the Richmond public construction industry sufficient to war-
rant race-based remedial relief.27 Furthermore, the absence of 
any evidence of past discrimination against protected groups 
other than Blacks, and extension of the preference to MBEs na-
tionwide, the Council's failure to consider race-neutral mecha-
nisms, and use of a rigid quota apparently tied only to minority 
representation in the general population, were found to under-
mine the claim of remedial motivation.28 
From the opinions forging the majority, which applied the 
strict scrutiny standard to the Richmond ordinance, some guid-
ing principles can be articulated. First, remedial affirmative ac-
24. [d. at 510. 
25. [d. at 521. 
26. [d. at 511 n.1. The newly appointed Justice to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, agrees with Justice Stevens that remedying past discrimination is not the only 
basis for affirmative action. See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 
420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun, (dissenting), would not subject remedial affirmative action pro-
grams to strict scrutiny. Croson, 488 U.S. at 535. 
27. See id. at 498-500. Justice O'Connor maintained that a generalized claim of past 
discrimination in an industry fails to provide appropriate guidance for defining the per-
missible scope of relief. [d. at 505. Furthermore, she refused to permit an inference that 
racial rather than race-neutral factors accounted for the gross disparity between the per-
centage of minorities in the Richmond population (50%) and the percentage of public 
contracts that had been awarded to MBEs over the past five years (0.67%). [d. at 501, 
503. 
28. See id. at 506. 
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tion is allowable only where there is at least some concrete evi-
dence of local or regional discriminatory impact identifiably or 
inferably tied to past or ongoing private or governmental action. 
Second, the remedy undertaken must be linked specifically to 
group(s) suffering the identified discriminatory effects and must 
not unduly burden members of the majority group.29 
B. CROSON'S INFLUENCE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW 
Various lower federal courts have purported to apply the 
Croson analysis in reviewing other public sector affirmative ac-
tion efforts, primarily set-aside programs and minority employ-
ment preferences. Adoption of the Richmond ordinance was 
deemed to produce a constitutionally unacceptable local affirma-
tive action program, though the Court also indicated that state 
and local use of race-based affirmative action is permissible 
under appropriate circumstances.3o In evaluating these other af-
firmative action programs under Croson, the important points 
for comparison are the factual record supporting the acting en-
tity's determination that present effects of past discrimination 
persist and the degree of specificity exercised by the entity in 
formulating a mechanism to address the discriminatory effects. 
This article examines what passes muster under these points by 
examining the outcomes in various cases. In conjunction with 
this, the author seeks to explain the apparent variation in ap-
proval rates for the two types of state and local affirmative ac-
tion programs examined. 
II. FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATIONS OF THE CROSON 
ANAL YSIS: APPLICATION IN OTHER SET -ASIDE 
CONTEXTS 
The Croson decision raised some concerns about the viabil-
ity of state and local set-aside programs, and prompted some 
very different scholarly opinions about the effects of the deci-
sion.31 However, despite the natural variations between the 
29. See Franke, supra note 2, at 626. 
30. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509, 511, 528; and Franke, supra note 2, at n.6. 
31. See, e.g., Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative 
Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Charles 
Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the 
6
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records supporting affirmative action plans and the mechanics of 
the programs themselves, review and comparison of different 
courts' applications of Croson produces some useful insights as 
to which set-aside programs will survive strict scrutiny under 
the Constitution. 
In O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia,32 the 
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the 
District's Minority Contracting Act. 33 The act, in its amended 
version, imposed on all District agencies a goal of awarding 
thirty-five percent of the value of construction contracts to local 
MBEs.34 Minority groups included Black Americans, Native 
Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islander Americans, and 
Hispanic Americans economically and socially disadvantaged 
due to membership in these groups because of historical discrim-
ination. 31i The Minority Business Opportunity Commission, 
charged with implementation of the Act, established a "shel-
tered market" whereby certain contracts were set-aside for lim-
ited bidding competition among MBEs.36 The Commission also 
had the discretion to attempt to increase minority participation 
by other means such as waiver of bonding requirements and di-
vision of large contracts into smaller ones.37 
The evidence of prior discrimination relied upon in enacting 
the original set-aside included some informal data indicating 
that approximately three hundred MBEs were operating in the 
District in 1974, and data for a subset of those MBEs showed 
that they performed approximately five percent of the total (pri-
vate and public) local construction contracts.3S Extrapolating 
Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99 
YALE L.J. 163 (1989). 
32. O'Donnell Contr. Co., 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This decision reversed a 
denial of a preliminary injunction by the District Court. See O'Donnell Constr. Co., 762 
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1991). 
33. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1141 to 1-1151 (1992). 
34. O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 422. 
35. Id. MBEs had to be certified by the Commission in order to participate in the 
sheltered market bidding. Id. 
36. Id. MBEs were permitted to participate in all regular non-sheltered contracts as 
well. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 425-26. Additionally, some anecdotal testimony of individual experiences 
of discrimination were considered in the enactment process. All evidence of discrimina-
tion apparently focused on discrimination against Blacks. Id. at 427. 
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from this information on the availability of qualified MBEs, and 
analyzing MBE usage versus availability for the Department of 
General Services, it was estimated that MBEs could perform 
thirty-four percent of that department's construction contracts 
but that only 3.4 percent of the department's construction ex-
penditures had been going to MBEs.39 This estimate apparently 
provided the rationale for concluding that a twenty-five percent 
goal was reasonable.40 In 1983, the Act was amended without 
formal consideration of additional evidence. The definition of 
minorities favored was narrowed to include only those MBEs 
with a place of business within the District, and the MBE par-
ticipation goal was raised to thirty-five percent.41 
The court found the D.C. set-aside defective under both 
prongs of Croson. The court rejected the statistics proffered as 
evidence of discrimination, rather than MBEs' focus on other 
types of contracts, especially in light of the fact that much of the 
anecdotal testimony related to difficulties encountered by MBEs 
that were not directly race-related.42 The fact that no additional 
evidence was considered in raising the goal to thirty-five percent 
in 1983, the failure to produce any evidence of discrimination 
against protected groups other than Blacks, and the reliance on 
evidence including information relating to MBEs outside of the 
District, coupled with the failure to include a sunset provision in 
the amended act, caused the court to conclude that the plan was 
not narrowly tailored to address identified effects of past 
discrimination.43 
A district court within the Second Circuit was faced with a 
39. [d. at 426. 
40. [d. Using the "rule of thumb" that surety bond rating procedures usually permit 
doubling of the previous year's production, the Council considered that MBEs actually 
had the capability to perform 68 percent of these construction contracts. [d. 
41. [d. at 427-28. The sunset provision included in the original act was not included 
in the amended act. [d. at 428. 
42. Parroting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson, 488 U.S. at 503, the court as-
serted that many non-discriminatory reasons could explain the disparity between the 
percentages of MBEs participating in public construction contracts and the overall per-
centages of MBEs. The court also pointed to other statistics showing that a much higher 
percent of some types of non-construction contracts had been awarded to MBEs by the 
Department of General Services. O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 426. Finally, the 
court refused to credit testimony by MBEs regarding such 'things as difficulty meeting 
bonding requirements as demonstrating race-specific discrimination. [d. at 427. 
43. [d. at 427-28. 
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challenge to the renewal of a successful set-aside program in As-
sociated General Contractors v. New Haven. 44 That case in-
volved a set-aside program favoring disadvantaged business en-
terprises (DBEs), where minorities were rebuttably presumed to 
be disadvantaged.41~ During the time period of the original set-
aside program female and minority (combined) participation in 
city construction contracts rose from less than one percent to 
twenty-five percent.46 In 1989, as a basis for renewing the pro-
gram, the city conducted studies of the local construction indus-
try, finding evidence of long standing discrimination, inability of 
race-neutral measures to end the discrimination, a substantial 
lack of MBE participation in commercial contracts without set-
asides, and confirmed the effectiveness of the current set-aside 
program in increasing MBE participation, all based on testi-
mony from representatives of MBEs and WBEs.47 However, the 
court found this anecdotal evidence, standing alone, insufficient 
to support a claim that renewal of the set-aside was necessary to 
remedy continuing effects of discrimination. The court did indi-
cate that the city might have met that burden by showing that 
removal of the set-aside would likely significantly decrease MBE 
participation with evidence showing a statistical disparity be-
tween MBE availability and MBE participation in the local pri-
vate construction arena;48 Finally, failure to document discrimi-
nation against any "disadvantaged" business other than 
disadvantage based on race was deemed to render the program 
overinclusive, and thus not appropriately tailored to its asserted 
remedial purpose.49 
In Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Education, a district 
44. Assoc. General Contractors, 791 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1992). 
45. [d. at 942. This program, like those of many of the states and localities with 
MBE programs also had a set-aside for women-owned or controlled enterprises (WBEs), 
which typically are also subject to challenge for violation of equal protection principles. 
See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989); 
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991). However, it is beyond the 
scope of this article to analyze the challenges to WBE programs. Many courts have ac-
knowledged that classifications based on sex have been subject to a lesser, intermediate 
degree of constitutional scrutiny, and that this intermediate standard would also carry 
over into review of gender based affirmative action. Associated Gen. Contractors, 791 F. 
Supp. at 942. 
46. [d. at 943. 
47. [d. at 945. 
48. [d. at 945-47. 
49. [d. at 948. 
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court in Pennsylvania reviewed a facial challenge to the Phila-
delphia School Board's MBE set-aside for construction con-
tracts. IIO The set-aside policy required contractors to subcontract 
at least fifteen percent of the contract value to MBEs, or provide 
a written request for waiver reciting the reasons that a MBE 
could not be found or used on the particular contract. III Adop-
tion of the policy was prompted by investigation of MBE com-
plaints which showed that nonminority contractors had failed to 
subcontract to low bidding MBEs for pre textual reasons.1I2 Addi-
tionally, the Board found that its use of "bidders lists" which 
included very few MBEs, a poor attitude of its employees to-
ward disseminating bidding information to new participants, 
and practices such as imposition of high bonding requirements, 
limited minority participation, accounting for the award of only 
0.5 percent of contracts to MBEs in 1982-83.113 Here, the court 
found the evidentiary basis for the program too general, since it 
related largely to race-neutral practices, and the remedy over-
broad in that it did not provide for an individualized determina-
tion that those benefiting under the plan were victims of past 
discrimination and it failed to consider race-neutral alternative 
measures. 1I4 
A district court in Maryland overturned the Minority Pro-
curement Policy implemented by a state administrative agency 
in Concrete General v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-
mission. 1I1I The policy, adopted by legislative resolution, set a 
twenty-five percent goal for minority participation in agency 
50. Main Line Paving Co., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989). This program also 
involved a WBE set-aside. See supra note 45. 
51. [d. at 1352 (stipulation of facts). A MBE prime contractor could fulfill this re-
quirement by performing at least 15 percent of the contract itself. [d. 
52. [d. at 1354. 
53. [d. at 1354-55. The Board had previously adopted a small scale set-aside policy, 
and MBEs complained that they were not able to effectively participate in the program 
because they were not getting necessary bidding information from Board employees. [d. 
The Board was also aware of findings by the City Council relied upon to enact a city set-
aside program. [d. 
54. [d. at 1361-62. The court reasoned that race-neutral alternatives, such as aban-
donment of bidders lists and lowering of bonding requirements, must be considered first 
to minimize the burden on nonminorities. The court also noted that few waiver requests 
had been granted. [d. at 1362. 
55. Concrete General, 779 F. Supp. 370 (D. Md. 1991). The policy was challenged as 
applied to impose MBE restricted bidding on a particular contract, thus denying nonmi-
nority contractors any chance to participate. [d. at 373, 382. 
10
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contracts. 56 Revised in 1987, the policy listed six mechanisms 
available to be used to increase MBE participation: 1) require 
contractors to subcontract at least 10 percent of the value of the 
contract to MBEs; 2) accept MBE bids that are within 10 per-
cent of the lowest overall bid; 3) employ MBE restricted bid-
ding; 4) negotiate contracts directly with MBEs; 5) waive bond-
ing and insurance requirements for MBEs; and 6) waive 
experience requirements for MBEs.57 Under the policy Blacks, 
Hispanics, American Indians, Alaskan natives, Asians, Pacific Is-
landers, women, and physically or mentally disabled persons, 
without geographical limitation, were recognized as minorities.58 
The policy did not include a sunset provision, though it did pro-
vide for annual review. 59 
The underlying record supporting adoption of the policy 
was not well developed. The department had noted that it had a 
list of contracting firms, 6.54 percent of which were MBEs, but 
that only 3 percent of its contract dollars were granted to 
MBEs.60 There was some other statistical and anecdotal evi-
dence of discrimination in the award of state contracts, but the 
court deemed the record incomplete for resolution by summary 
judgment.6} However, the court did resolve the complaint on the 
basis of the policy's overinclusiveness: the policy benefitted 
groups against which no evidence of past discrimination had 
been offered. It imposed no local geographic limits for the pref-
erence,62 and the Commission offered no evidence that it consid-
ered the least intrusive means for achieving its goa1.63 In addi-
tion, the policy had no individual waiver or general termination 
56. [d. at 371. The court concluded that the Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-
mission exceeded the scope of its legislative authority in adopting the Minority Procure-
ment Policy, though it went on to evaluate the constitutional issues. [d. at 374-77. 
57. [d. at 371-72. The mechanism to be used was to be selected in order to maximize 
present awards to MBEs and future participation of MBEs, minimize interference with 
the efficient operation of the agency, and generally maximize the goals of the policy. [d. 
at 372. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. Concrete General, 779 F. Supp. at 378. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 379. Even though the policy, as applied here, benefitted a local Black busi-
ness, the court found the overinclusiveness contrary to the permissible intention of reme-
dying identified effects of past discrimination. [d. 
63. [d. at 380-81. The Commission offered no justification for its decision to use 
restricted bidding rather than the less intrusive alternatives such as waiver of bonding, 
insurance, or experience requirements for MBEs. [d. 
11
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provisions,64 and the overall MBE participation goal set at 25 
percent was focused on general population figures and substan-
tially exceeded the percentage of available qualified MBEs.611 
F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, Ohio66 involved 
a challenge to a municipal MBE set-aside adopted for the pur-
poses of granting more meaningful and representative participa-
tion in city contracts for minorities and women. The set-aside 
sought to avoid future discrimination against these groups, to 
promote the city's general welfare by encouraging the establish-
ment and expansion of MBEs, to stabilize the economy, and to 
preserve employment opportunities.67 Pre-enactment hearings 
conducted by the city had not disclosed past discrimination 
against MBEs in the award of city contracts.6S The program 
benefitted MBEs certified by the city, primarily on the basis of 
membership in one of the following groups: Blacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, and American Indians.69 Percentage MBE subcontract-
ing goals were set by type of contract and ranged from three to 
fourteen percent, though a partial or total waiver was available 
if sufficient qualified MBEs could not be located.70 Failure to 
base the program on a finding of past or present discrimination 
in the award of city contracts, as well as failure to consider race-
neutral means to pursue the city's goal were fatal to this 
program.71 
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a challenge72 to a state pro-
gram setting aside certain state funded highway contracts for 
DBEs,73 which was merely an extension of the federally man-
64. Id. at 381. The court deemed this evidence that the policy was not intended to 
help MBEs overcome the effects of past discrimination. Id. 
65. Id. at 382. 
66. F. Buddie Contracting Co., 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
67. Id. at 1022. The challenge was brought by a contractor whose bid was rejected 
for failure to comply with the MBE requirement. The city program also included a WBE 
set-aside. Id. at 1020. 
68. Id. at 1022. 
69. Id. at 1022-23. 
70. Id. at 1023. There was a right to appeal the denial of a waiver. Id. 
71. F. Buddie Contracting Co., 773 F. Supp. at 1031-32. The availability of a waiver 
did not save the program. Id. 
72. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 
111 S.Ct. 2261 (1991). 
73. Even though the program benefitted disadvantaged businesses as opposed to mi-
nority businesses, the rebuttable presumption that minorities are disadvantaged was 
deemed to render this a race-based preference, subject to strict scrutiny review. Milwau-
12
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dated highway set-aside under the Surface Transportation Uni-
form Relocation Assistance Act74 to non-federally funded con-
tracts. Here, absent an independent evidentiary basis for the 
state's conclusion that the set-aside was needed to' remedy the 
effects of past discrimination regarding the construction indus-
try within the state, the sta~e's independent application of the 
federal program could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.7~ 
The Ninth Circuit has reviewed two local set-aside pro-
grams since the announcement of the Croson decision. In the 
first case, Coral Construction Co. u. King County,76 the plan was 
amended after the Croson decision. Minority businesses in-
cluded under the plan were those certified by the state as owned 
or controlled by Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, American Indians, 
and Alaskan natives." The plan provided for a percentage pref-
erence for bidders using MBEs on small contracts,78 and set con-
tract-specific MBE subcontracting set-asides for larger con-
tracts.79 A reduction in set-aside levels or complete waiver of the 
set-aside requirement was available where it was demonstrated 
that it was not feasible to find MBEs or that use of MBEs would 
unreasonably increase costs.80 The evidence initially relied upon 
kee Pavers Ass'n, 922 F.2d at 421. 
74. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987). 
75. Milwaukee Pavers Ass'n, 922 F.2d at 421. See also supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text. The same issue and outcome was involved in the Eleventh Circuit case, H.K. 
Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 975 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1992). 
76. Coral Canstr. Co., 941 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1991). There were some further 
amendments to the plan in 1990, which were not relevant to this review. [d. at 915. 
77. [d. at 914. The 1989 amendments required the County Office of Civil Rights and 
Compliance to monitor implementation of the plan to ensure that no particular group 
was unfairly or disproportionately favored, and that the plan was not in effect any longer 
than necessary. The plan also had a set-aside for similarly certified female owned or 
controlled businesses. [d. 
78. This provision allowed a preference for a contractor who was within five percent 
of the lowest overall bid, if that contractor was using an MBE, for contracts up to 
$10,000. The 1989 amendments to the plan provided for a flexible percentage MBE sub-
contracting figure to be set on a case by case basis. [d. at 914-15. 
79. The program also permitted use of the percentage preference method for large 
contracts if it was deemed the best way to get increased MBE participation. In this case, 
the percentage preference method had been used to award a contract involving more 
than $10,000 to the second lowest bidder, a minority contractor. The 1989 amendments 
applied the MBE subcontracting set-aside to all contractors, including MBEs, unless the 
MBE contractor was performing at least 25 percent of the contract work itself. Coral, 
941 F.2d at 914. The plan also included some race-neutral mechanisms such as provision 
of training and information access for businesses wishing to bid on county contracts. [d. 
at 923. 
80. [d. at 914. 
13
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to demonstrate the need for remedial relief consisted of more 
than 700 pages of affidavits from fifty-seven women and minori-
ties documenting specific instances of discrimination in the local 
construction industry, covering a broad spectrum of the covered 
groups and including experiences of discrimination on public 
projects.81 Though anecdotal evidence alone was 'deemed insuffi-
cient to support a finding that affirmative action was necessary, 
the court asserted that statistical evidence gathered during the 
1990 amendment process also could be considered under strict 
scrutiny analysis.82 Design of the remedy here seemed to be ap-
propriately narrowed. Some race-neutral activities included with 
the set-aside provisions and individual contract set-aside deter-
minations, together with the availability of the waiver, made the 
plan flexible.8s However, further analysis of the record was 
deemed necessary to determine whether the benefits of the plan 
were defined by MBEs experiences of discrimination specifically 
in King County.84 
Associated General Contractors of California u. Coalition 
involved an MBE bidding preference on city contracts.81i After 
an earlier MBE bid preference had been overturned, the city un-
dertook an investigation regarding continued discrimination in 
city contracting, receiving testimony from forty-two witnesses 
and written submissions from 127 others, and additionally held 
ten public hearings on the matter.86 A study commissioned by 
81. Id. at 917-19. 
82. Id. at 919-20. There must be some evidence of prior discrimination at the time 
of enactment to provide some support for the remedy and to ensure that the remedy is 
narrowly tailored to address that discrimination. Id. at 920. Here, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the challengers and remanded 
that portion of the case for full consideration of the issue of whether the county had, in 
light of all the evidence, a compelling interest in addressing the lingering effects of past 
discrimination. Id. at 921-22. 
83. Id. at 923-24. 
84. Id. at 925. The plan appeared to be overbroad in that it allowed for certification 
of MBEs if the business suffered from discrimination in its locale (not necessarily King 
County). The appropriate issue was defined not as the location of the business, but 
whether it has suffered discrimination in King County. If the benefits are defined by 
findings that a business, local or not, has suffered the effects of discrimination when it 
tried to do business in King County, the plan would not be overbroad. Id. The summary 
judgment granted to challengers on the issue of the plan's overbreadth also was reversed. 
Id. at 926. 
85. Assoc. General Contractors of California, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). The 
program also granted a preference to WBEs and locally owned businesses (LBEs). 
86. Id. at 1404. The investigation was begun before the Croson decision, and the 
public hearings were held after Croson. Id. 
14
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the city showed large statistical disparities between the availa-
bility of MBEs and the amount of city contracting awarded to 
MBEs.87 The 1989 ordinance granted bid preferences to prime 
contractors who are members of groups found to be disadvan-
taged by previous bid practices, specifically granting a 5 percent 
bid preference for MBEs, defined as disadvantaged businesses 
owned by Blacks, Latinos and Asians.88 Local businesses were 
granted an additional (and cumulative) five percent preference.89 
The benefits of the bid preference were extended to other enter-
prises engaged in a joint venture with an MBE, where MBE par-
ticipation was at least thirty-five percent.90 Here, the court 
found that the city had made the requisite detailed findings of 
prior discrimination within its borders to justify a race-based 
remedy, and that the program was narrowly tailored because it 
was sufficiently flexible, focused on identified prior discrimina-
tion and economically disadvantaged businesses, and imposed 
only a slight burden on others.91 
The Eleventh Circuit visited the post-Croson set-aside issue 
in Cone Corp. u. Florida Department of Transportation. 92 In 
that case, Hillsborough County enacted an MBE program estab-
lishing a goal of awarding twenty-five percent of the value of 
county construction contracts to economically disadvantaged 
MBEs.93 MBE goals for individual projects, up to fifty percent, 
were to be set based on the number of available eligible MBEs.94 
The plan provided for a pre-bid conference for discussion of 
MBE requirements, and waiver of the goal prior to advertise-
87. [d. at 1414. The study showed MBE availability at 49.5 percent, but contract 
dollar participation by MBEs at only 11.1 percent. 
88. [d. at 1404. Economically disadvantaged businesses were defined as those having 
average gross receipts that did not exceed fourteen million for the prior three years. [d. 
89. Assoc. General Contractors of California, 950 F.2d at 1404. Thus, local MBEs 
received a 10 percent bid preference. 
90. [d. at 1404. 
91. [d. at 1416-18. Specifically, the use of a bid preference rather than a quota, the 
definition of beneficiaries on the basis of experience of prior bid discrimination, the abil-
ity of nonminority contractors to participate via the joint venture option, and the limited 
geographic scope of the preference were noted by the court. [d. 
92. Cone Corp., 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990). In a later review of this case, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that the challenger did not have standing. Cone Corp., 921 
F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court has since reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit's position on standing. See Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors 
of Am. v. Jacksonville, Florida, 61 U.S.L.W. 4626 (June 15, 1993). 
93. [d. at 910. 
94. [d. 
15
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ment if deemed to be injurious to health, safety, or welfare (in-
cluding financial concerns.}911 Enactment of this plan followed a 
long term, but unsuccessful, attempt by the county to increase 
MBE participation in public contracts under a voluntary affirm-
ative action program.96 At the time, statistics compiled over a six 
year period in the local area showed that though MBEs made up 
twelve percent of the local contractor population, only 6.3 per-
cent of county contracts (6.6 percent of contract value) went to 
MBEs, and most of that was accounted for in one contract.97 
Supplemented by numerous individual complaints of discrimina-
tion in county procurement, the court deemed this record suffi-
cient to indicate a prima facie case of discrimination, thus justi-
fying the race-specific remedy.98 Furthermore, the county's 
attempt to use a voluntary program, the individual and flexible 
setting of goals, the availability of waiver, and the targeting of 
groups locally represented and most likely still suffering the ef-
fects of past discrimination were found to adequately tailor the 
remedy to redress the identified problem.99 
III. LESSONS REGARDING SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS 
In general, state and local set-aside programs have not fared 
well under judicial application of the Croson standards. Part of 
the problem is due to the fact that the factual record underlying 
adoption of the Richmond ordinance was poorly defined,I°o lead-
95. [d. at 910-11. Working with the three lowest bids, the County Administrator was 
to check compliance with the MBE goal and/or the contractor's good faith efforts to 
comply with the goal. If the low bidder was deemed not responsive to the MBE goal, s/he 
was permitted to protest that finding. If still deemed not responsive, and the next lowest 
bid was either $100,000 or fifteen percent higher than the low bid, the MBE goal was to 
be waived. Otherwise, the County Administrator had discretion to make a final decision. 
[d. at 911. 
96. [d. at 909-10. After initial adoption of the voluntary program in 1978, studies in 
1981 and 1984 indicated that minorities still were significantly underrepresented in 
awards of county contracts. [d. at 910. 
97. Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 915. 7.89 percent of purchase orders and 1.22 percent of 
total county expenditures went to MBEs. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 916-17. 
100. Because Richmond City Council adopted the ordinance at a time when Fulli-
loue was considered to define the standard under which public sector affirmative action 
programs could be adopted, and because the ordinance mimicked the Congressional set-
aside upheld under constitutional challenge in Fulliloue, the Council apparently referred 
loosely or by inference to evidence of discrimination justifying the remedial program, 
without assembling a clear record of how that "general" discrimination specifically im-
16
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ing to very different interpretations of its breadth and depth. 
For instance, the majority supporting Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis of the evidence in Croson eschewed the references to Rich-
mond's well-documented and extensive history of racial discrim-
ination in general because of the Council's failure to document a 
direct link between that history and the current experiences of 
local minority contractors. lOl On that basis, O'Connor refused to 
infer that discrimination accounted for the gross under-
representation of minorities in the construction industry and in 
local contractors' associations, despite an overwhelming statisti-
cal disparity.lo2 In contrast, Justice Marshall, joined by two 
others in his dissent, decried the majority's failure to evaluate 
the record in its proper historical context.103 He criticized the 
majority's notion that discrimination and its effects could be 
separated out into discrete actions with discrete, easily identifi-
able reactions. lo4 Marshall's evaluation of the record accepted 
evidence of discrimination in the construction industry nation-
ally and a general pattern of racial discrimination locally as suf-
ficiently probative of a problem in the local industry to justify a 
race-specific remedy. Because the evidentiary basis for adoption 
of the Richmond ordinance was at least arguably much stronger 
than it was credited to be by the majority, other courts evaluat-
ing similar records, even where the acting body has gone farther 
in establishing a link between the "general discrimination" and 
the current status of minorities, may devalue those records, de-
clining to fully credit the strength of evidence of discrimination 
having a tangential link to present experiences of local 
minorities. 
Compounded by the Croson majority's viewpoint, courts 
have been reluctant to approve race-specific remedies that have 
not been specifically linked to direct effects of racial discrimina-
tion. lOIl For example, courts have declined to recognize bonding 
pacted on MBEs within the local construction industry. 
101. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505. 
102. [d. at 501, 503. 
103. [d. at 529-30. 
104. [d. at 530-32. Marshall also pointed out that where discriminatory exclusion 
from a given area is alleged, comparison of minority participation in that area to minor-
ity representation in the general (local) population is the only relevant comparison to be 
made. [d. at 529. 
105. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992). 
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and insurance requirements, experience requirements and other 
"race-neutral" factors in the contracting hade as having greater 
adverse impact on minorities because of historic discrimina-
tion. loa Thus, set-aside programs have been overturned because 
the acting entity drafted its program on the presumption that 
particular groups have suffered from general opportunity barri-
ers because of membership in a minority group rather than fo-
cusing on documentation of the disparate impact evident on the 
basis of apparently race-neutral factors. lo7 
Another recurrent problem with state and local set-asides is 
linked to the inclusion of racial groups other than Blacks. Again, 
in drafting the Richmond ordinance, the Council adopted Con-
gress' definition of minorities, probably without much thought 
about its inclusion of groups not represented locally. !Os Gener-
ally, in adoption of non-discrimination or affirmative action poli-
cies, there is a tendency to include all groups of arguably margi-
nal representation or status - most bodies acting on such 
policies do not want to be accused of favoring one group over 
another. However, while the experience of discrimination for 
Blacks in the United States was/is pervasive and largely consis-
tent across the nation, and fairly well acknowledged, experiences 
of discrimination by other racial groups are often perceived as 
more regional and less prevalent. Thus, in assembling the evi-
dence of past discrimination, policymakers have tended to focus 
on evidence relating to the experience of Blacks. lo9 Set-asides in-
cluding other racial groups are then subject to charges of 
overbreadth. llo 
Examination of the unique features of those set-aside pro-
grams which have passed muster under strict scrutiny analysis, 
106. See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349, 1354, 1361-
62 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
107. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992). This is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's treatment of the disparate impact 
claim in the Wards Cove case, where it denied relief to disparate impact claimants be-
cause they failed to identify the specific employment practice(s) that operated to dispro-
portionately exclude minorities. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989). 
108. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528. 
109. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992); Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 948 (D. Conn. 
1992). 
110. [d. 
18
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and contrasting them with features of unsuccessful programs, of-
fers refinement to the lessons of Croson in defining the perime-
ter within which constitutionally permissible set-aside programs 
fall. First, the acting entity must be concerned with develop-
ment of the record to support the conclusion that race-based af-
firmative action is a necessary response to continuing effects of 
discrimination. A statistical record of significant disparities be-
tween local minority representation in a particular arena and 
minorities instantly availablelll to participate in the field is re-
quired.1I2 Even a strong statistical record will generally need 
supplementation with anecdotal evidence of individual exper-
iences of discrimination.1l3 This type of evidence should provide 
the link between membership in a particular racial group and an 
experience of discrimination on what appears to be a race-neu-
tral factor, such as obtaining insurance, price quotes, etc.1I4 To 
the extent that the set-aside covers racial groups other than 
Blacks, at least some documentation, both statistical and anec-
dotal, must relate to discrimination against those groups.l1II 
Second, the statistical record must be the basis for the de-
termination of goals for minority representation; goals must be 
set in reasonable relation to the number of locally available 
qualified minorities, and thus should also be flexible and varia-
ble in different contexts. lIS Furthermore, the benefits of the pro-
gram should be limited to those minority entities which have ex-
111. This defines minority entities currently in existence and locally available to 
participate in the subject activity. 
112. See, e.g., Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 9lO, 917-19 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding that even a large, specific anecdotal record of local discrimination in pub-
lic contracting deemed insufficient to support need for remedial program without subse-
quent statistical substantiation). 
113. Failure of the Richmond ordinance lay, in part, in the failure to document indi-
vidual experiences of discrimination in the local construction industry. In fact, represent-
atives of the local contractors' associations, all of which had virtually no minority mem-
bership, testified that they were not aware of discrimination practiced locally. However, 
no testimony was obtained from local MBEs. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 479-80. 
114. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 945-47 
(D. Conn. 1992) (inferring that proffered anecdotal evidence, together with related statis-
tical disparity (lacking in the record) would have been enough to justify renewal of the 
set-aside program}. 
115. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
116. Cf. Concrete Gen. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp. 
370, 382 (D. Md. 1991) (striking down MBE participation goals set in relation to general 
population figures), and Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition, 950 F.2d 1401, 
1414, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding flexible MBE preference, tied to those MBEs 
having previously received a lower than expected percentage of contracts). 
19
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perienced the effects of local discrimination.1l7 In this vein also, 
the acting body must evaluate race-neutral alternatives to a set-
aside, and explain a conclusion that such alternatives would not 
be effective in eliminating the continuing effects of discrimina-
tion.1I8 Waiver of the set-aside must be available upon a showing 
that qualified minorities are not available, that adherence to the 
set-aside is too costly, or that use of a particular minority entity 
is not justified on the basis of experiences of discrimination. 119 
Some mechanism for ensuring that the set-aside is abandoned 
when its goals have been reached must be included.120 Finally, 
the set-aside must limit its negative impact on nonminorities.121 
IV. APPLICATION IN EMPLOYMENT SETTINGS 
In public employment settings, affirmative action' programs 
are often, though not always, linked to settlements of individual 
or class discrimination lawsuits. In such cases, there is at least 
some allegation of misconduct by the acting entity, although a 
formal record substantiating those allegations may be lacking or 
incomplete, depending upon the point in the proceedings where 
settlement occurs. Where there have been underlying judicial 
findings of discrimination, some courts offer more deference to 
such a record as support for affirmative action efforts.122 Simi-
117. See, e.g., Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(remanding for determination of whether MBEs benefitted were limited to those who 
had suffered to effects of past discrimination within King County). 
118. See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-62 
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (overturning program, in part, because of school board's failure to at-
tempt race-neutral means to overcome the effects of discrimination). 
119. [d. (finding program overbroad because it did not provide for individualized 
determination that MBEs included in the preference were victims of past discrimination 
and virtually no waivers of set-aside had ever been granted); cf. Cone Corp. v. Florida 
Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 908, 916-17 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding program appropriately 
narrowed because, inter alia, waiver available and benefit targeted to groups most likely 
still suffering the effects of discrimination). 
120. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 428 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (finding program flawed for failure to include sunset provision). 
121. Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition, 950 F.2d 1401, 1417-18 
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding burden on non minorities is slight, especially where their partici-
pation in preference is possible via joint ventures with MBEs); Concrete Gen. v. Wash-
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp. 370, 380-81 (D. Md. 1991) (finding pro-
gram not appropriately tailored where failure to justify the use of the more intrusive 
means of restricted bidding for MBEs over less intrusive means, such as waiver of bond-
ing and experience requirements for MBEs). 
122. See, e.g., Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1282 (7th Cir. 1992), rear-
gued en bane, opinion vacated, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding heightened judicial 
20
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larly, to the extent there is judicial involvement in fashioning or 
approving an affirmative action remedy, more deference may be 
accorded by a reviewing court regarding the tailoring of the rem-
edy.123 Of course, where there has been no underlying litigation 
prompting adoption of an affirmative action hiring or promotion 
plan, review of the plan should be like the review accorded set-
aside plans, as explored above. 
The First Circuit reviewed a challenge to affirmative action 
measures undertaken pursuant to a consent decree in Stuart u. 
Roache,I2' where nonminority police officers challenged the con-
tinued adherence to a pre-Croson consent decree favoring pro-
motion of minority officers on the basis of race. The consent de-
cree had been entered in 1980, settling a claim that previous 
discrimination in hiring and use of a racially biased promotional 
exam resulted in an almost entirely white force at the sergeant 
level. l211 The decree required the department to adopt validated 
non-discriminatory promotional tools and to make appointments 
to overcome the underutilization of minorities as sergeants, set-
ting an ultimate goal of having nine percent Black sergeants by 
1985.126 By 1985, a validated fair exam had not been adopted, 
and the decree was extended to 1990.127 In 1990, only one vali-
dated fair exam had been administered and the nine percent 
goal had not been reached, so the decree was extended until one 
more fair exam could be administered and the goal for minority 
oversight of consent decree not dispositive, but helpful to ensure that action is based on 
an appropriate remedial purpose and that the means are narrowly tailored); Freeman v. 
City of Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aft'd. mem., 947 F.2d 935 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (holding that in context of approval of a consent decree implementing a pref-
erential hiring policy, the court did not require as strong a showing of a statistical imbal-
ance as would be needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination). 
123. See, e.g., Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273 (1st Cir. 1992) (reviewing a 
challenge to continued adherence to a 1974 consent decree requiring an eligibility prefer-
ence for minority firefighters, the First Circuit deferred to the district court's determina-
tion that, although a race-neutral exam was adopted in 1987 and 1989 hiring of minori-
ties was in greater proportion than their 1974 representation in the general population, 
continued affirmative action was necessary and the decree was sufficiently tailored in 
that it provided only a limited advantage to only qualified minorities for a limited period 
of time, with little disturbance to the expectations of nonminorities). 
124. Stuart, 951 F.2d 446 (1st. Cir. 1991). 
125. [d. At that point, only one of 222 sergeanta (0.45 percent) was Black, though 
Blacks represented 5.5 percent of the police force and 20 percent of the general popula-
tion. In 1971, there had been a court determination that the city discriminated against 
Blacks at the entry level for the police force. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
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representation was raised to 15.5 percent since it was estimated 
that twenty percent of the promotion eligible force would be 
Black.128 The court upheld use of the plan, finding that the ap-
propriate statistical comparisonl29 yielded a prima facie case of 
discrimination, augmented by the earlier findings that discrimi-
nation in the entry level exam had further lowered the pool of 
Blacks eligible for promotion.130 Likewise, the court found the 
plan narrowly tailored since it benefitted only the pool of quali-
fied minorities, the goals were linked to the size of that pool, the 
advantage was limited and of small impact on nonminorities, the 
duration was limited, and race-neutral alternatives would not be 
effective. 131 
In Crumpton u. Bridgeport Education Association, the Sec-
ond Circuit had to address the much thornier issue involved in 
an attempt to add a preferential lay-off policy to an existing af-
firmative action hiring policy developed pursuant to a consent 
decree.132 The underlying class action suit, alleging segregation 
in the Bridgeport school system, was never litigated; the parties 
entered into a consent decree requiring, inter alia, an affirmative 
minority teacher recruitment program.133 The court then ap-
proved a hiring plan that required the city to use its best efforts 
to hire minority teachers at a rate at least equal to that for 
nonminority teachers until the percentage of Black and Hispanic 
teachers was equal to the proportionate representation of those 
groups in the area workforce.134 When lay-offs of tea~hers later 
became necessary, the city sought and obtained district court 
approval of an interpretation of the hiring plan to impose an 
absolute preference for the retention of minority teachers.1311 On 
review, the Second Circuit refused to accept the parties' stipula-
tions as to prior discrimination in the school system as providing 
128. [d. 
129. The court noted that this comparison between the numbers of minorities pro-
moted and the numbers of minorities eligible for promotion was appropriate, contrasting 
it with the statistical comparison made in Croson. The court specifically noted that it 
would not be appropriate to compare the number of minority promotions to the number 
of minorities who passed the test since the problem was that the test unfairly disquali-
fied minorities. [d. at 450-51. 
130. [d. at 452. 
131. [d. at 453-55. 
132. Crumpton, 993 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1993). 
133. [d. at 1025. The consent decree was entered in 1979. [d. 
134. [d. at 1026. 
135. I d. at 1.027. 
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an adequate basis upon which the city could deem the preferen-
tial lay-off policy as necessary to remedy the identified effects of 
past discrimination.136 The court went on to. conclude that the 
proposed modification to the plan also failed in that the absolute 
preference imposed far too harsh a burden on nonminorities. 137 
The Third Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's 
approval of a consent decree allowing for out of rank order hir-
ing of minority police officers, pending adoption of a valid exam, 
in Freeman u. City of Philadelphia. 13s The decree settled an un-
derlying claim that the written exam administered for police re-
cruits discriminated against Blacks, and capped a series of law-
suits charging discrimination in various parts of the police 
recruitment process.139 The test results did show a disparate im-
pact on Blacks, particularly when those passing the test were 
rank ordered.140 There was no evidence that the test had been 
validated and, in fact, anecdotal evidence indicated that the test 
was not an effective predictor of job performance. l41 The order 
forbade the certification of an eligibility list based on test results 
if Blacks had a pass rate significantly lower than that of other 
racial groups or if the percentage of Blacks in the top 1000 
names on the list was significantly less than the percentage of 
Blacks who passed the test, unless the court certified that the 
test was a valid indicator of job performance, or the city ap-
pointed Blacks from the list in proportion to their pass rate on 
the test. l42 The district court found that manifest racial imbal-
ance, sufficient to establish a disparate impact, warranted the 
approval of the affirmative action measure, particularly since the 
136. [d. at 1028. The court specifically noted that the stipulation of facts was not 
equivalent to a judicial determination that prior discrimination existed in the school sys-
tem. [d. 
137. [d. at 1030-31. Because of a provision in the contract between the city and the 
teachers' union agreeing that lay-off policies should be modified to preserve gains made 
under the affirmative action hiring plan, the Second Circuit intimated that a less drastic 
lay-off preference, such as one maintaining the proportional representation of minorities, 
could pass muster. [d. at 1026, 1031. 
138. Freeman, 751 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd. mem., 947 F.2d 935 (3rd Cir. 
1991). 
139. [d. at 511. 
140. [d. at 513-14. White applicants were significantly disproportionately repre-
sented in the highest ranks. [d. 
141. [d. at 515. 
142. Freeman, 751 F. Supp. at 512. The city was also charged with soliciting alterna-
tive valid testing ideas. [d. 
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measure addressed the problem, imposing little hardship on 
nonminorities, and would be temporary pending adoption of a 
validated exam.143 
Maryland Troopers Association, Inc. v. Evans involved a 
challenge to a consent decree under which the Maryland State 
Police agreed to hire and promote Black troopers in specified 
percentages.144 The decree at issue settled a lawsuit alleging 
ongoing racial discrimination in the hiring and promotion of 
troopers.1411 The evidentiary basis for the design and approval of 
the decree consisted of a report citing cronyism within the Ma-
ryland State Police as a culprit in the low representation of 
Blacks in the upper ranks of the force and a statistical compari-
son showing a disparity between the percentage of Blacks in the 
various ranks of the force and the representation of Black Mary-
land residents working in jobs with equivalent job skills.146 The 
Fourth Circuit found this evidence void of any showing that the 
state had engaged in discrimination justifying the race-based 
preference. It rejected the attempt to equate cronyism with ra-
cism and it refused to infer that discrimination, rather than a 
preference among Blacks for non-police work, accounted for dis-
parities in the proffered statistical comparisons of numbers of 
Blacks in various ranks and numbers of Blacks in "equivalent" 
143. [d. at 516-19. The court actually treated this as a voluntary affirmative action 
undertaking, distinguishing between the discretion permitted for volitional behavior of 
an employer and need for a finding of misconduct to support the coercive power of a 
court. [d. at 516. The court also noted that the plan at issue here did not interfere with 
nonminorities' interests since no-one has a vested interest in being hired on the basis of 
performance on an unvalidated exam. [d. at 518. 
144. Maryland Troopers Assoc., 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993). The overall goal was 
22 percent representation for Blacks. The decree did not require the hiring or promotion 
of anyone not otherwise qualified. [d. at 1075. 
145. In an earlier case, the United States had sued Maryland for racial discrimina-
tion in the hiring of state troopers. That litigation was resolved by a consent decree 
setting a goal of achieving overall representation of 16 percent Black troopers in five 
years. Later changes in the terms of the decree led to adoption of a plan setting numeri-
cal hiring and promotion goals to be effective until a non-biased process was imple-
mented. Under that plan, the percentage of Black troopers hired and promoted in-
creased. [d. at 1072-75. The decree at issue in the instant case arose from a suit filed 
later. 
146. Id. at 1073-76. Census data was used to identify the percentage of Blacks em-
ployed in jobs deemed by the Coalition of Black Maryland State Troopers (plaintiffs in 
the underlying lawsuit) and the Maryl~nd State Police to have equivalent skills to par-
ticular positions within the force. At the entry level, the comparison was made to the 
percentage of Black Maryland residents who met the minimum qualifications for a state 
trooper, i.e. 20-58 years old, with a high school diploma. [d. at 1075-76. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/3
1994] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 411 
jobs, absent some individual complaints of discriminatory 
treatment. 147 
The Sixth Circuit has had several occasions to address the 
constitutional requirements for public sector affirmative action. 
In Long v. City of Saginaw, former police officers challenged an 
amendment to the city's affirmative action plan that authorized 
hiring of new minority officers at the expense of recalling fur-
loughed officers.148 The underlying affirmative action plan was 
adopted in 1974 in response to a report by the Human Relations 
Commission that minorities were underutilized in various city 
departments, including the police department, and imposed an 
80 percent minority hiring goal for the police department.149 Due 
to a lack of hiring and unsuccessful efforts to recruit minorities, 
the percentage of Blacks on the force remained very low. Facing 
first a moratorium on new hiring, and later lay-offs, the city and 
the police officers' union entered into an agreement overriding 
vested seniority rights in order to supplant recalls with new mi-
nority hires.l6O This court focused on the second prong of strict 
scrutiny analysis and found the burden here imposed on nonmi-
norities too burdensome. un Especially in view of the fact that 
there was no evidence of discrimination-based complaints or liti-
gation justifying the remedial relief, less intrusive means, such 
as preferential hiring, were all that the court would permit to 
meet the city's goals of increasing minority representation on 
the police force. 1112 
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati involved another affirmative ac-
tion plan adopted to increase minority representation in the po-
lice force, although this plan was adopted pursuant to entry of a 
consent decree settling a discrimination claim brought against 
the city by the Justice Department.lII3 At that time, 33.7 percent 
147. [d. at 1077-78. The court discounted the proffered statistics because it found 
no gross disparity, thus leaving open the possibility that qualified Blacks simply pre-
ferred non-police work, and because there was no corroboration of the statistical dispar-
ity with anecdotal evidence of individual experiences of discrimination. [d. at 1077. Be-
cause of its conclusion that the affirmative action plan was not justified by the record, 
the court never reached the issue of whether the plan was narrowly tailored. 
148. Long, 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990). . 
149. [d. at 1194. 
150. [d. at 1195 . 
. 151. [d. at 1196-97. 
152. [d. at 1197. 
153. Vogel, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 86 (1992). The de-
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of the applicants for positions on the force were Black, though 
only 20.4 percent of the appointments made were Blacks, and 
only 9.9 percent of officers on the force were Black while the city 
population was twenty-four percent Black. ltl4 The ultimate goal 
of the decree was minority representation on the force propor-
tionate to minority representation in the qualified labor pool, 
and an interim goal was set to hire minorities in at least the 
percentage they represented in the current recruit class. 11I1I The 
decree required no unnecessary hiring and no hiring of less qual-
ified persons as evaluated according to properly validated selec-
tion devices, and would terminate when the ultimate goal was 
reached. 11I6 The court accepted the statistiCal comparisons relat-
ing specifically to the Cincinnati police force and to the appli-
cant pool rather than general population figures as giving the 
city a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was nec-
essary.11I7 It also found the goals, set according to the minority 
representation achieved after affirmative recruitment efforts, 
provided a sufficient link between the remedy and the identified 
discrimination. IllS 
The dissolution of a consent decree implementing an affirm-
ative action plan was appealed in Jansen v. City of Cincin-
nati. 11I9 In the decree, resolving claims of racial discrimination in 
hiring for firefighter positions, the city agreed to pursue a goal of 
achieving 18 percent minority representation in its overall 
workforce,160 subject to the availability of qualified minorities, 
with one measure of effort requiring at least 40 percent minori-
ties in the firefighters recruit class.161 The city implemented the 
decree by using dual hiring lists, by race, for all recruits success-
cree also covered women, but that aspect of the plan is omitted from the discussion here. 
154. Id. at 600. 
155. Id. at 596. The 1980 recruit class was 34 percent minorities as the result of 
recent recruiting efforts. I d. 
156. [d. 
157. Id. at 600-01. 
158. Id. 
159. Jansen, 977 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1992), reh'g. en bane denied, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 34153 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992), eert. denied, 124 L.Ed.2d 254, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 
3262 (1993). 
160. The 18 percent minority representation was reached in 1986. Jansen, 977 F.2d 
at 241. 
161. Id. at 240. The decree set out hiring goals by percentage goals and target dates 
(1974-1980). Id. 
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fully completing all phases of the recruitment process.162 The 
Sixth Circuit found that a manifest racial imbalance justified the 
1974 decree, and that changes in the city's racial composition, 
together with new claims of discrimination brought in 1990 pre-
vented the challengers from carrying their burden of negating 
the inference of discrimination.163 The use of dual hiring lists 
passed the "narrowly tailored" test since the written exams used 
by the department had never been validated, except as ensuring 
minimum qualifications, the exam was only one of five qualifica-
tion factors, and failure to use dual lists would have resulted in a 
significant underrepresentation of minorities. 164 
The Seventh Circuit case of Billislz, v. City of Chicago con-
solidated review. of two cases involving affirmative action hiring 
and promotion programs adopted in conjunction with consent 
decrees settling claims of racial discrimination in the city's fire 
department. 166 A 1974 consent decree established an interim 50 
percent minority hiring goal and a long range goal of increasing 
minority representation in the fire department to approximate 
minority representation in the general population.166 The other 
decree capped a series of challenges to the city's promotional 
exam, and imposed an interim one minority to four nonminority 
hiring ratio in mid-rank positions, with a long term goal of 
bringing minority representation in higher ranks into parity with 
minority representation in lower ranks. 167 Minority promotions 
162. [d. Civil service rules also permitted hiring by the "rule of three," allowing any 
one of the top three candidates to be hired. [d. at 240-41. 
163. [d. at 244-45. Though the goal of 18 percent minority representation in the 
department overall had been reached, the decree had not set a maximum goal, and the 
court refused to interpret the decree as inferring that minority representation beyond 18 
percent would not raise an inference of discrimination in hiring. [d. at 244. 
164. [d. at 243-44. 
165. Billish, 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992), reargued en banc and opinion vacated, 
989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993). 
166. Billish, 962 F.2d at 1273. At the time the decree was entered, there was only 
five percent minority representation in the fire department. General population figures 
were used for comparison because entering firefighters needed no special training or aca-
demic achievement. Since little hiring had been done through 1978, and minority repre-
sentation was only nine percent, the order was extended to 1980. In 1979, a new eligibil-
ity list was adopted. If the list was used for more than two years or 500 hires, 50 percent 
of further hiring was to be minority hires. [d. 
167. [d. at 1273-74. The decree authorized expansion of the candidate pool by low-
ering the passing grade cut-off, and included goals of redesigning the promotion proce-
dure to eliminate disparate impact and providing training to those seeking promotions. 
These goals were included in the collective bargaining agreement between the city and 
the firefighters. [d. at 1274-75. 
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were made out of rank order on the basis of this affirmative ac-
tion plan.166 The Seventh Circuit panel found that the statistical 
evidence of discrimination underlying the consent decrees 
helped establish the need for remedial relief,169 and that the city 
was justified in concluding that affirmative action was still nec-
essary to comply with the underlying decree because of continu-
ing problems attaining increased minority representation in the 
upper ranks of the department.17O In the aggregate, the panel 
concluded that the city had a strong basis for concluding that its 
hiring and promotion policies were necessary.171 It similarly 
found the more recent promotion plan narrowly tailored in that 
promotions out of rank order were only made where no alterna-
tive would work. 172 The goals were flexible, limited, and reasona-
bly related to the relevant labor market,173 and the impact on 
nonminorities was minimal.17• Subsequently, the Seventh Cir-
168. Id. at 1275-76. Regarding 1986 promotions made on the basis of the 1979 eligi-
bility list, the first eighteen promotions of lieutenants to captains, made in rank order, 
went to white firefighters. Two minority firefighters were promoted after the cut-off score 
was lowered. The personnel department certified the lower ranked minorities as qualified 
based on additional experience. The test had not been validated, and expert testimony 
indicated that it would not be possible to validate the test. Id. at 1275. Regarding 1987 
promotions to the rank of engineer, made on the basis of the newer eligibility list, the 
last eight of fifty-six promotions were minorities out of rank order. Id. at 1276. Later 
promotions to captain, based on the new captain eligibility list, included one out of rank 
order promotion based on race. Id. 
169. Id. at 1283-84. The court noted that the heightened judicial oversight involved 
in a consent decree helps to ensure that race-conscious action is based on an appropriate 
remedial purpose and that the action is narrowly tailored to further that purpose. Id. at 
1282. The court also approved of the statistical comparison relied upon, comparing mi-
nority representation in each rank against minority representation in the rank below, 
from which promotions are drawn. Id. at 1284. 
170. Jansen, 977 F.2d at 1282-83. 
171. Id. at 1289. 
172. Since promotions to a higher rank were only made from the rank below, other 
mechanisms, such as increasing recruitment efforts, were not available. Id. at 1290. 
173. Firefighters had to meet minimum qualifications to get a job, the preferential 
promotional scheme was limited to three years or a shorter duration during which the 
goals were attained, and it was realistic to tie the goals to the percentage of minorities in 
the ranks below, from which promotions were to be drawn. Id. 
174. Id. at 1291. Nonminorities have no vested right to rank order promotions, and 
Croson merely requires that those benefitted by affirmative action be members of the 
group(s) who suffered the effects of prior discrimination. [d. at 1291-92. The court re, 
manded the Billish case (involving the claim based on out of rank hiring from the 1979 
captain eligibility list). C{. Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No.2 v. Washington, 736 
F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (involving out of rank order promotions from the 1986 
engineer eligibility list and the 1987 captain eligibility list, here approved by the Seventh 
Circuit) for reconsideration of the equal protection claim because the district court had 
not applied strict scrutiny in deciding that issue. Id. at 1302. Since the evidence justify, 
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cuit, en bane, vacated the panel opinion and remanded the case 
for development of the record and trial of the issues of whether 
the affirmative action efforts were justified on the basis of past 
discrimination and necessary because of continuing discrimina-
tory effect.1711 
A consent decree settling extensive, long term litigation con-
cerning discrimination on the basis of sex and race in the city's 
fire department was subject to challenge in Davis v. City & 
County of San Franeiseo. 176 Several earlier lawsuits involved 
disparate impact claims regarding the department's entry-level 
and promotional exams, which had never been validated.177 Liti-
gation underlying the consent decree at issue alleged continued 
adverse impact on minorities regarding the city's most recently 
adopted entrance and promotional exams.178 The Ninth Circuit 
,found that the statistical disparities, sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, were suffi-
ciently probative of discrimination in the context of non-skilled 
entry-level employment, and that the department workforce, 
from which promotions were drawn, was the appropriate com-
parison group for targeting minority representation goals for 
promotion. 179 Likewise, except for needing addition of a sunset 
provision, the court deemed the program narrowed to permit 
flexible goals,180 reasonably related to the relevant labor force,181 
ing the city's remedial action would parallel that approved in the Chicago Fire Fighters 
case, the focus on review was to be whether the granting of out of rank promotions from 
the earlier eligibility list was also narrowly tailored to the city's remedial purpose, [d. at 
1301. 
175. Billish, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir, 1993). One issue prompting the remand was fo-
cused on whether the department should have delayed making the out of rank order 
hires until the results of a new, validated exam, expected to be available within months, 
were indeed available. 
176. Davis, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989). On the union's subsequent appeal of this 
case, the court determined that the union lacked standing to appeal since no member it 
represented had suffered an injury in fact, See United States v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 979 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1992). 
177. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1442-43, This case refers to the district court case, 696 F. 
Supp, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1988), for a complete history of the underlying litigation, What 
becomes obvious from a quick review of this history is that continued attempts to adopt 
a valid, non-discriminatory exam were unsuccessful. 
178. 890 F.2d at 1443-44. 
179. [d. at 1447. 
180. [d. Referring to the district court's analysis of the tailoring of the remedy, see 
United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287, 1309 (N,D, Cal. 
1988) (holding only qualified minorities were to be hired or promoted, adjustment of 
goals was contemplated for changes in circumstances, and a waiver was included), 
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and not unduly burdensome to nonminorities. 182 
In Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, the 
Ninth Circuit approved of the practice of banding scores from a 
police department promotional exam in order to increase the 
number of minorities promoted.18s A prior consent decree set-
tling race and sex discrimination claims had set target minority 
appointment goals based on minority representation in the qual-
ified applicant pool, with an ultimate goal of 45 percent minority 
representation within the department. 184 The court deemed the 
evidence of past discrimination supporting the original consent 
decree, augmented by a continued adverse impact in the most 
recent exam, enough to provide a strong basis for concluding 
that the effects of discrimination continued to exist, and that 
use of banding, with consideration of selection factors in addi-
tion to race, was an allowable mechanism to address that 
discrimination.181! 
On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, a district court in 
Florida reconsidered a constitutional challenge to an affirmative 
action program permitting preferential hiring of women and mi-
norities in light of Croson.1 86 In 1983, the fire department found 
that its workforce had a significant underrepresentation of mi-
norities and women as compared with representation of those 
181. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1447, referring to 696 F. Supp. at 1310. The goals for minor-
ity representation at the unskilled, entry level were far below the percentage representa-
tion of these groups in the local population, and the figures for promotion were not out 
of line with the numbers of minorities in the force, from which promotions would be 
drawn. 
182. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1447, referring to 696 F. Supp. at 1310. Nonminorities still 
had ample opportunity to be hired and promoted. 
183. Officers for Justice, 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992). Banding of scores allows the 
city/county to treat scores within a set range as substantially equivalent. In this case, 
race would be a factor of selection from within a particular band. Id. at 724. 
184. [d. at 723. The Ninth Circuit noted that the earlier case was based on an undis-
puted history of discrimination. The decree also prohibited the use of unvalidated dis-
criminatory selection procedures. [d. In an earlier decision, the court had disapproved of 
a scoring system that changed the relative weight given different components of the 
exam in order to minimize disparate impact. San Francisco Police Officer's Ass'n, 869 
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989). 
185. Officers for Justice, 979 F.2d at 726-27. The court found that the evidence was 
enough to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the commission need 
not first prove the exam invalid in order to justify the use of race as a plus factor in an 
affirmative action program. Id. 
186. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
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groups in the local population. I87 In response, the department 
began ranking applicant groups separately based on race and 
sex, and hired in accordance with numerical goals calculated on 
the basis of the number of openings expected, the expected 
number of qualified applicants in each race/sex grouping, and 
the extent of underrepresentation in each category.I88 At trial on 
remand, the department augmented the evidentiary basis for the 
program by showing that it had made race-neutral attempts to 
increase minority representation with only limited success, that 
evaluation of test scores of applicants still showed that of those 
passing the entry-level test, non minorities were significantly 
overrepresented in the top scorers, and that several of the selec-
tion procedures had an adverse impact on minorities but could 
not be validated to predict future job performance. I89 The court 
found this evidence, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination because comparison to general population figures 
was appropriate for these entry-level firefighter positions, a 
strong basis for the remedial action. 190 Because the department 
187. In 1983, the fire department workforce of 921 was seventy-five percent white, 
though whites represented only forty-seven percent of the population, twelve percent 
Black, though Blacks represented seventeen percent of the population, fourteen percent 
Hispanic, though Hispanics represented thirty-six percent of the population, and one 
percent female, though females represented fifty-two percent of the population. The dis-
parities in prior years were similar or more magnified. [d. at 1458. 
188. [d. at 1458. A particular race/sex group was deemed to be significantly under-
represented if representation of members of the group in the fire department was less 
than 70 percent of the group's representation in the general (local) population. The long 
term goal of the program was to relieve underrepresentation of these groups in the de-
partment. The preferential hiring was to end when a significant disparity no longer ex-
isted. [d. 
189. [d. at 1458-60. The department produced testimony about active minority re-
cruitment efforts prior to adoption of the program, statistics showing that representation 
of minorities in the top 100 scorers on the test were 4.8 standard deviations from ex-
pected, different pass rates for whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and women (85%, 56%, 23%, 
42%, respectively) on the written test, and physical test components unrelated to 
fire fighting (i.e. swimming). The department also pointed to settlement of earlier litiga-
tion which required it to validate its selection procedures and to recruit Blacks. [d. at 
1460-61. 
190. [d. at 1462-64. The court acknowledged that entry-level firefighters had to meet 
some other qualificatio.ns, such as passing a vision test, but found that these specifics 
would be impossible to account for statistically. Absent challengers' ability to show that 
consideration of such factors would be possible and would significantly change the statis-
tical comparison, comparison to general population figures would be allowed here. [d. at 
1464. The court noted that settlement of the past litigation and anecdotal evidence of 
discrimination, alone, would not be enough to justify this affirmative action program, but 
are useful in supporting the justification based on statistical disparities. [d. at 1465. The 
court also specifically allowed consideration of evidence produced after implementation 
of the program to subsequently justify adoption of the program. [d. at 1466. 
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had attempted some race-neutral alternative, set flexible goals 
linked to the relevant labor market, limited benefits of the pro-
gram to qualified minorities, incorporated a provision for termi-
nation upon achievement of its goals, and was of limited impact 
on the rights of nonminorities, its program was sufficiently tai-
lored to the allowable remedial purpose.191 
V. A PATTERN OF BETTER SUCCESS? 
It is clear that state and local affirmative action programs in 
employment settings have been far less vulnerable to successful 
attack under the strict scrutiny standard. Part of the explana-
tion, as noted earlier, is rooted in the fact that the genesis for 
many of these programs is a consent decree settling charges of 
discrimination against the acting entity. This provides a direct 
link between the existence and effects of the alleged discrimina-
tion. In those cases where the underlying allegations of discrimi-
nation have been substantiated by a court, or at least subjected 
to some judicial scrutiny, other courts have been willing to ac-
cept that discrimination as sufficient evidence to support the en-
tity's resort to race-specific remedial action.192 However, where 
proceedings have not progressed to the point where there has 
been judicial analysis of the underlying claims, courts reviewing 
the resultant programs have been unwilling to condone estab-
lishment of affirmative action programs based on mere asser-
tions of discrimination.193 
Whatever record has been produced to substantiate the 
charges of discrimination in the underlying suit also serves to 
provide the link between the challenged conduct and the race-
specific effect, particularly where the conduct may appear to be 
race-neutral. The record, containing allegations of individual ex-
periences of discrimination and/or patterns of discriminatory 
impact, is then available to support the choice of remedy as nec-
191. [d. at 1466·71. 
192. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Not only can judicial review give 
independent credence to allegations of discrimination, where the record relating to 
charges of discrimination is developed, a pattern of disparate impact.may also be sub· 
stantiated. [d. 
193. See, e.g., Crumpton v. Bridgeport Educ. Ass'n., 993 F.2d 1023 (2nd Cir. 1993) 
(refusing to equate parties' stipulations as to existence of discrimination with judicial 
determination that such discrimination existed.) 
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essary to counter the identified discriminatory effects. 
Another problem associated with many set-aside programs, 
which tends to be eliminated in the context of affirmative action 
programs adopted pursuant to consent decrees, is the problem of 
overinclusiveness. While set-aside programs are generally 
adopted in a proactive attempt to address discrimination, they 
tend to expand coverage to include all "marginal" groups. Af-
firmative action programs adopted in response to particular 
charges of discrimination tend to focus reaction on the specific 
group(s) making the charges. Thus, they are not often vulnera-
ble to charges of overbreadth. 
In this light, the apparent increased approval for state and 
local affirmative action programs in employment is not really in-
consistent with the results of challenges to set-aside programs.194 
Thus, examination and comparison of the features of various 
state and local affirmative action employment plans yields a sim-
ilar measure of constitutional soundness. Again, a strong and 
relevant statistical showing of underrepresentation of minorities, 
augmented by experiences of the individuals alleging discrimina-
tion, is a requisite to success.19!\ Affirmative action goals ex-
tending beyond the remedy justified on the basis of the underly-
ing lawsuit must be independently justified.196 Goals must 
194. This statement is not intended to contradict the difference in burdens of proof 
for those chall.enging a program adopted by a legislative body versus a court approved 
consent decree. Croson clearly imposed the burden of proving the existence of local ef-
fects of discrimination justifying race-conscious action upon the entity undertaking such 
action. In contrast, challengers bear the burden of disproving underlying claims of dis-
crimination relied upon by a court in approving remedial action based thereon. This 
difference may account for some difference in the strength of statistical data necessary to 
meet the required justification for race-conscious relief. 
195. Cf, Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1454, 1457-58 (S.D. 
Fla. 1993) (finding program justified by significant statistical disparities between repre-
sentation of various groups in unskilled entry-level firefighter positions and representa-
tion of those groups in general population, documented over a seven year period); Mary-
land Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting statistical 
comparison of numbers of Blacks at various levels on police force with numbers of 
Blacks in "equivalent skilled jobs" in the absence of reference to specific complaints of 
discriminatory treatment). 
196. Cf, Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 448 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing extension of 
decree, and modification of minority promotion goal, based on evidence of change in 
racial composition of relevant labor pool); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1197 
(6th Cir. 1990) (adopting agreement calling for new minority hires to displace furloughed 
nonminority officers subject to recall impermissible not justified by evidence of depart-
ment's discrimination). 
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reasonably relate to dismantling the identified discrimination 
and must be limited by the availability of qualified minority 
group members.I97 Goals must also avoid placing undue burdens 
on nonminorities. I98 Finally, the program must provide for its 
termination upon achievement of its goals. I99 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite an apparent variation in the federal courts' willing-
ness to approve state and local affirmative action plans in em-
ployment settings versus state and local minority set-aside pro-
grams, this review of cases indicates that the same basic 
parameters define a constitutionally acceptable program of ei-
ther type.200 Lower federal courts applying Croson are closely 
scrutinizing the evidence relied upon to justify state and local 
resort to race-based affirmative action, as well as the design of 
the affirmative action program in relation to that evidence. 
Courts are requiring the acting entity to establish the existence 
of an underrepresentation of minorities in a given arena based 
upon a statistical disparity between the local availability of 
qualified minorities and the rate of their participation in the 
arena. Courts are further requiring substantiation of a discrimi-
natory reason for the underrepresentation with individual ac-
counts of experiences of discrimination. This record then pro-
vides the measure for the scope of permissible action. The 
program and goals adopted must relate directly to overcoming 
the documented underrepresentation in the manner least intru-
sive to nonminority interests. Clearing these rather high hurdles 
has proven more difficult for entities undertaking proactive at-
197. Cf. Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 454 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding minority promo-
tion goals appropriately linked to pool of qualified minorities); Maryland Troopers Ass'n 
v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that goal must be reasonably re-
lated to minority representation in qualified labor pool, not to representation in general 
population). 
198. Cf. Crumpton v. Bridgeport Educ. Ass'n, 993 F.2d 1023, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1993) 
(finding preferential lay-off policy too burdensome on nonminorities); Freeman v. City of 
Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd memo 947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding out of rank order hiring does not unnecessarily trammel rights/expecta-
tions of nonminorities). 
199. See, e.g., Davis V. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1447 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (finding program was tailored to its authorized remedial purpose, but required 
addition of sunset provision). Of course, consent decrees are subject to continued judicial 
oversight during their life. 
200. See supra notes 111-121, 192-199 and accompanying text. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/3
1994] . AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 421 
tempts to address local discrimination than for entities adopting 
affirmative action in response to legal claims of discrimination . 
. However, this review additionally shows that, in spite of the 
increasing hostility toward race-based affirmative action,201 af-
firmative action programs carefully crafted in response to spe-
cific local experiences of discrimination will pass muster under 
challenge.202 Although one may take issue with the motivation 
for imposition of the more restrictive analysis regarding these 
programs, the consequent imposition of requirements that a spe-
cific, local factual study of existing effects of discrimination sup-
port adoption of the program, and that the design of the pro-
gram effectively addresses the findings of such a study, may at 
least help alter general attitudes toward affirmative action. At 
least one widely held belief, that affirmative action programs 
merely grant gratuitous benefits to (often unqualified) minori-
ties, fails in the face of the strict scrutiny standard as announced 
and applied under Croson and subsequent cases. Under this an-
alytic framework, though, the next and perhaps more important 
step, permitting ·affirmative action efforts based on the goal of 
achieving diversity, remains elusive.203 
201. See, e.g., Sylvester Monroe, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt?, TIME, May 
27, 1991, at 23. 
202. See also Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement of Affirmative 
Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989). 
203. The Croson focus on past discrimination as justification for race-conscious ac-
tion has been adopted without exception by the lower courts. See, e.g., F. Buddie Con-
tracting Co. v. City of Elyria, 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding set-aside 
adopted for purpuses of promoting general welfare and avoiding future discrimination 
failed because it was not adopted in response to findings of past or present discrimina-
tion); see also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. This narrow focus ignores the 
compelling societal interest in some circumstances to legislate to achieve equal results 
rather than merely equal opportunity. This interest may stem from a simple need for 
diversity to achieve equality, such as a need to have teacher/role models representing the 
student constituencies of a school, or may arise from the awareness that the substantive 
values pervading the "procedural" mechanisms of equal opportunity are too far in-
grained to be fully eradicated. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirma-
tive Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 
1735-45 (1989). Justice Stevens, and now Justice Ginsburg, have specifically recognized 
the potential of justifying public sector affirmative action programs with a goal of achiev-
ing diversity. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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